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Two Kinds of Adaptation, Two Kinds of Relativity. 
 
Krzysztof Kontek 
Artal Investments, Warsaw1 
Abstract 
 
This paper presents a review of adaptation concepts at the evolutionary, environ-
mental, neural, sensory, mental and mathematical levels, including Helson’s and Parducci’s 
theories of perception and category judgments. Two kinds of adaptation can be clearly distin-
guished. The first, known as level adaptation, refers to the shift of the neutral perception level 
to the average stimulus value. It results in a single reference point and stimuli changes repre-
sented in absolute terms. This concept is employed by Prospect Theory, which assumes that 
gains and losses are perceived as monetary amounts. The second kind of adaptation refers to 
the adjustment of perception sensitivity to stimuli range. It results in two reference points 
(minimum and maximum stimulus) and stimuli changes perceived in relative terms. Both 
range adaptation and range relativity are well documented phenomena and have even been 
confirmed by the creators of Prospect Theory. This makes room for another decision making 
theory based on the range relativity approach. As shown by Kontek (2009), such a theory 
would not require the concept of probability weighting to describe lottery experiments or be-
havioral paradoxes. 
JEL classification: C91, D03, D81, D87 
Keywords: Adaptation-Level Theory, Range-Frequency Theory, Prospect Theory 
1. Introduction 
The term “adaptation” has a broad meaning and is widely used in numerous sciences 
and has many connotations (especially in biology in an evolutionary context). The term also 
appears to have psychological associations with the article “Hedonic Adaptation” by Freder-
ick and Loewenstein (1999) being the basic source of information on the subject. The primary 
motivation for this paper is to clearly distinguish the two kinds of adaptation.  
Level adaptation refers to the shifting of the neutral perception level to the average 
stimulus value. This kind of adaptation was introduced by Helson in “Adaptation-Level The-
                                                 
1Contact: ul. Chrościckiego 93/105, 02-414 Warsaw, Poland, e-mail: kkontek2000@yahoo.com.  
 2 
ory” (1964), and was further implemented by Brickman and Campbell in their “Hedonic 
Treadmill” hypothesis (1971). Level relativity means that there is a single reference point and 
that stimuli changes are represented in absolute terms. This concept is employed by Prospect 
Theory (1979), which assumes that gains and losses are perceived as monetary amounts.  
Range adaptation means the adjustment of perception sensitivity to stimuli deviations. 
This kind of adaptation leads to range relativity, proposed by Parducci in Range-Frequency 
Theory (1965). Range relativity postulates that there are two reference points (minimum and 
maximum stimulus value) and stimuli changes are represented in relative terms as a propor-
tion of the stimulus range.  
Both range adaptation and range relativity are well documented phenomena and have 
even been confirmed by the creators of Prospect Theory. For instance Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984) stated that “people spontaneously frame decisions in terms of topical account” which 
“leads people to evaluate gains and losses in relative rather than in absolute terms” (empha-
sis added). This observation, however, was only presented by Kahneman and Tversky a few 
years after the introduction of Prospect Theory.  
This makes room for another decision making theory based on the range relativity ap-
proach. It is not, however, the purpose of this paper to present one. It is nevertheless worth 
mentioning that Kontek (2009) has demonstrated that such a theory would not require the 
concept of probability weighting to describe lottery experiments or behavioral paradoxes. 
Even more surprisingly, the resulting utility function would strongly resemble the shape of the 
utility curve hypothesized by Markowitz in 1952 – the very shape Kahneman and Tversky 
rejected when introducing Prospect Theory. 
Although originally intended as merely a review, this paper makes an additional con-
tribution in that it clarifies the concepts of adaptation and relativity as used in Prospect The-
ory. It is quite commonly believed that Prospect Theory presents a relative approach to deci-
sion making as it introduced the concept of gains and losses2. Even recently, there has been a 
good deal of discussion over the question of where the single reference point is located: either 
it is the current wealth value as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) or some other 
value depending on the considered outcomes or any recent windfalls. However using a single 
reference point is only half the relativity approach as two reference points might be assumed. 
The first is the minimum outcome and is typically close to the current wealth value. The sec-
ond strongly depends on the attention focus but typically equals the maximum outcome of the 
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prospect. These two points define the range of considered options. Relativity in this sense is 
mathematically defined in terms of the ratio rather than the difference. 
This paper is also presenting a discussion with some other opinions on the different 
kinds of adaptation. For instance, Frederick and Loewenstein (1999) differentiate between 
“shifting adaptation level” and “desensitization”, although this fails to capture the essence of 
range adaptation.  
Finally, the paper (hopefully) presents a nice mosaic of opinions on the topic of adap-
tation from different academic disciplines. The literature on adaptation is vast. I was con-
fronted with the problem of whether to present the subject by using my own words or by cit-
ing other authors who have already covered it in their many excellent books and articles. I 
opted for the second approach if for no other reason than to avoid the charge of misinterpret-
ing and/or misrepresenting the concepts and opinions of others. This approach hopefully helps 
encapsulate the two kinds of adaptation and relativity. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Point 2 is devoted to the different 
meanings of adaptation at the evolutionary, neural, sensory, environmental and mental levels. 
Point 3 shows how utility in economics makes use of the concept of adaptation. Point 4 de-
scribes Helson’s Adaptation-Level Theory and Parducci's Range-Frequency Theory. Point 5 
presents a more detailed analysis of the two kinds of adaptation. Point 6 considers the differ-
ent kinds of relativity that result from different adaptation processes. Point 7 presents a dis-
cussion showing that the adaptation model adopted by Prospect Theory does not reflect the 
perception system, stymies the description of more complex behaviors, and results in an un-
necessarily complicated model. 
2. Different Meanings of Adaptation 
2.1. Evolutionary Adaptation 
Evolutionary adaptation was first described by British natural theologians John Ray 
(1627–1705) and William Paley (1743–1805). The theory was later refined by Charles Dar-
win (1809–82) in his “Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or, the Preservation 
of the Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life” (1859). Peter Medawar, winner of the Nobel 
Prize for Medicine and Physiology in 1960, describes the term as “a process allowing organ-
isms to change to become better suited for survival and reproduction in their given habitat”. 
Rappaport (1971) defines adaptation as “the processes by which organisms or groups of or-
ganisms maintain homeostasis in and among themselves in the face of both short-term envi-
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ronmental fluctuations and long-term changes in the composition and structure of their envi-
ronments”. 
Adaptation is frequently understood as a property/feature or effect of change rather 
than the process itself. The Oxford Dictionary of Science defines adaptation as “any change 
in the structure or functioning of an organism that makes it better suited to its environment”. 
Another definition states that “an adaptation is an anatomical, physiological, or behavioral 
trait that contributes to an individual's ability to survive and reproduce ('fitness') in competi-
tion with conspecifics in the environment in which it evolved" (Williams, 1966). Summarizing 
“adaptation can refer to a trait that confers some fitness on an animal, but it also represents 
the process by which that trait has come about” (Greenberg, 2010).  
2.2. Neural (sensory) adaptation  
“Neural or sensory adaptation is a change over time in the responsiveness of the sen-
sory system to a constant stimulus. More generally, the term refers to a temporary change of 
the neural response to a stimulus as the result of preceding stimulation”. This Wikipedia de-
finition3 is close to those met in academic texts: “Adaptation in the context of sensation refers 
to the fact that a prolonged and uniform sensory stimulus eventually ceases to give rise to a 
sensory message” (Medawar, 1983). “Adaptation can be simply defined as a change in the 
relationship between stimulus and response that has been induced by the level of stimulus” 
(Laughlin, 1989). “On the phenomenological level, (neural) adaptation is the change of the 
strength of the neuronal response during prolonged stimulation (typically decrease). This is 
commonly observed in experiments, in which a sensory or current stimulus is transiently 
turned on, usually preceded by a situation, in which the neuron is not excited. Then, the neu-
rons start to respond strongly, and this response will decay and eventually reach a steady 
state value… However, this does not automatically imply that this change provides means for 
the sensory system to be adjusted to the current environment. The phenomenological perspec-
tive rather looks on the process of adaptation, while the functional view focuses on the result 
(i.e. on a change to become better suited to the current environment an individual animal is 
confronted with)” (Hildebrandt, 2010).  
The best example of the neural adaptation is eye adaptation. “The human eye can 
function from very dark to very bright levels of light — its sensing capabilities reach across 
nine orders of magnitude. However, in any given moment of time, the eye can only sense a 
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contrast ratio of one thousand. What enables the wider reach is that the eye adapts its defini-
tion of what is black. The light level that is interpreted as ‘black’ can be shifted across six or-
ders of magnitude—a factor of one million” (Wikipedia). Similar mechanisms are well at-
tested for smell, temperature, taste, pain and touch (Gregory, Colman, 1995). “Someone who 
goes into a room containing a bowl of roses may smell them at first, but then become unaware 
of them. Once this process of sensory adaptation has occurred, no effort of attention can call 
smell to mind” (Medawar, 1983). 
2.3. Environmental Adaptation 
The definitions presented so far all assume that it is the living organism which adapts 
to changing environmental conditions. However, from the standpoint of a human being, adap-
tation may be seen as a process of changing the external world to suit its requirements. This 
was best expressed by Leakey (1981) as follows: “Animals adapt themselves to environment, 
hominids adapt environment to themselves using tools, language and complex cooperative 
social structures”. This concept of adaptation is employed in contexts like film, theatre and 
literary adaptation, and is understood as both a process producing a particular result and the 
result itself. People tend to adapt more complex problems to suit their own intellectual capa-
bilities, just as a scriptwriter has to squeeze the content of a multi-plot novel into a two-hour 
movie script. This is usually accomplished by transforming and simplifying complex ideas 
into something less complicated and more readily comprehensible. 
The concept of adaptation can be used bilaterally to describe the same situation. For 
instance, a person could be said to adapt to variable light conditions, or alternatively, to adapt 
those variable light conditions to the optimal level at which the brain can process incoming 
information via the mechanisms of eye adaptation. 
2.4. Mental Adaptation 
Mutual human - environment interaction was described by the famous Swiss psy-
chologist Jean Piaget, who “considers in fact intelligence rising from mental adaptation, 
where the adaptation is the equilibration of the action of an organism on the environment (as-
similation) and of the action of the environment on the organism (accommodation). The sub-
ject assimilates the external world into existing structures (initially consisting in only inher-
ited mechanisms) and updates them according to the experienced transformations, thus it ac-
commodates them to the external objects” (Maniezzo, Roffilli, 2005).  
In the author’s opinion, the term “mental adaptation” is best expressed as “the state of 
not thinking about certain phenomena”. This definition follows the Sulavik (1997) paper on 
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mental adaptation to death in the case of professional rescuers, although it can easily be ex-
tended to cover many other situations like stress, major illness, bereavement, financial loss, 
immigration (Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2006), disasters (Leon, 2004) or even space travel (NASA). It 
has been proved that many difficulties with mental adaptation have a biological basis and are 
marked by MAO (monoamine oxidase) activity (Giraldi et al, 2007). The resulting depression 
and anxiety states are therefore treated by its inhibitors (MAOI). Returning to a healthy psy-
chic state requires that those unpleasant, and sometimes tragic, experiences not be dwelled 
upon so intensely, if at all. It should be borne in mind that mental adaptation occurs in posi-
tive situations as well – financial windfalls, professional achievements, falling in love etc. 
“Hedonic treadmill” is another term for mental adaptation coined by Brickman and 
Campbell (1971) “to describe the now widely accepted notion that though people continue to 
accrue experiences and objects that make them happy – or unhappy – their overall level of 
well-being tends to remain fairly static. The logic behind this argument stems from adaptation 
level theory (Helson, 1964), which argues that people perceive objects not in any absolute 
sense, but rather relative to a level established by previous experiences. Therefore, when peo-
ple experience a positive event, two effects take in place: in the short run, well being in-
creases; in the long run, however, people habituate to their new circumstances, which dimin-
ishes the positive effect of that event” (Mochon et al., 2008). “Perhaps the most dramatic evi-
dence for this hypothesis was the finding that lottery winners were not particularly happy and 
that paraplegics were not much less unhappy than most readers would have anticipated” 
(Kahneman, 1999). This means that people adapt to their current situation and report a similar 
level of happiness. 
2.5. Evolutionary basis 
There are several other meanings of adaptation encountered in the literature (e.g. so-
cial adaptation). A wide coverage of hedonic adaptation examples is given by Frederick and 
Loewenstein (1999). Nevertheless, most of them have a common feature, viz. they signify a 
shift of either the organism’s structure or its perception system to a new level. As a result, 
people (and animals) become better suited to external conditions, do not sense any more ex-
ternal stimuli, and cease to think about certain phenomena. This process or trait definitely has 
an evolutionary basis. As Medawar (1983) stated: “In a sense all evolution is adaptation”. 
Failure to adapt would unnecessarily sap limited brain resources needed to perceive new 
stimuli and, in the extreme case, bring about the extinction of the species. Burying the past is 
therefore a prerequisite to experiencing the present and the future.  
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3.  Adaptation in Utility Considerations 
As the concept of adaptation is so widely accepted, its appearance in utility considera-
tions should come as no surprise. 
3.1. In 1952, Harry Markowitz published an article entitled “The Utility of Wealth” in 
which he presented his utility function hypothesis (see Figure 3.1a). Although Markowitz 
does not employ the concept of adaptation, the shape of the curve he proposes suggests that 
such an assumption was implicit. Markowitz noted: “To summarize my hypothesis: the utility 
function has three inflection points. The middle inflection point is defined to be at the ‘cus-
tomary’ level of wealth. Except in cases of recent windfall, customary wealth equals present 
wealth”. 
 
Figure 3.1. Left - Markowitz Utility Function (1952); Right – Prospect Theory Value Function 
(1979).  
 
Markowitz states that the present value of wealth becomes the reference point for util-
ity considerations, although he also stresses that the middle inflection point may not match 
this value due to recent experiences. In adaptation terms, this may be explained as an individ-
ual’s failure to mentally adapt to his or her new net worth when this is suddenly changed. 
3.2. A very similar approach, albeit with a differently shaped utility function (Figure 
3.1b), was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky when publishing their Prospect Theory in 
1979. Kahneman and Tversky explain: “An essential feature of the present theory is that the 
carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than final states. This assumption is 
compatible with basic principles of perception and judgment. Our perceptual apparatus is 
attuned to the evaluation of changes or differences rather than to the evaluation of absolute 
magnitudes. When we respond to attributes such as brightness, loudness, or temperature, the 
past and present context of experience defines an adaptation level, or reference point, and 
stimuli are perceived in relation to this reference point (Helson, 1964). Thus, an object at a 
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given temperature may be experienced as hot or cold to the touch depending on the tempera-
ture to which one has adapted. The same principle applies to non - sensory attributes such as 
health, prestige, and wealth” (Kahnemann, Tversky, 1979). As a result, Prospect Theory pre-
sented the value function as a function of gains and losses expressed in absolute terms. 
The above quotation would suggest that Prospect Theory has a solid psychophysical 
basis. This, however, is not entirely true. As will be shown in the following points, Kahneman 
and Tversky (as well as Brickman and Campbell in their hedonic treadmill hypothesis) ap-
plied Helson’s Adaptation-Level Theory whereas more modern theories may offer a better 
explanation of people’s judgments.  
4. Helson vs. Parducci 
4.1. Helson (1964) argued that adaptation may represent a fundamental “law” of cog-
nition and behavior. His Adaptation-Level Theory holds that the quality and magnitude of a 
response is a function of the distance above or below the adaptation level - a subjective point 
of equality at which stimuli are neutral. “AL theory maintains that this neutral or adapted 
background stimuli provide a basis, frame of reference, or standard against which new stim-
uli are perceived” (Roeckelein, 1998). “Helson defines Adaptation Level as a weighted loga-
rithmic mean of all past and present stimulation on a given dimension. As each new stimulus 
is presented, it will be averaged into the computation of a new AL” (Eiser, 1986). The theory 
is described in more detail by Anderson (who, by the way, criticized it, 1992): “Helson 
stressed the importance of context effects in psychophysics and perception. The response to a 
focal stimulus could not be understood without reference to context and background stimuli. 
Helson claimed to have found a general solution with the concept of adaptation. The entire 
stimulus field was reduced to a single value, the adaptation level (AL), and the focal stimulus 
was judged relative to this AL. The adaptation level (AL) was taken to be a pooled average of 
all relevant stimuli” (including past ones). Anderson then goes on to say: “The AL is only one 
step towards perceptual value. The perceptual value of any stimulus is determined by a ratio 
comparison to the AL”. As Helson attempted to use Fechner’s logarithmic formula, the per-
ceptual value is the difference between the logarithm of stimulus S and the logarithm of AL. 
Adaptation-Level Theory therefore considers AL as the neutral point, or “zero of function”. 
“The essence of Helson’s version is that the stimulus that is experienced as ‘neutral’ or ‘av-
erage’ (the adaptation level), is simply the average stimulus; other stimuli are judged higher 
or lower in proportion to their differences from this average” (Birnbaum, Parducci, 1995). 
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This is the concept which, with some modifications, is implemented in Prospect Theory4.  
4.2. “Despite of AL theory’s strong influence on psychophysical and perceptual theo-
rizing during the fifties and sixties (Appley, 1971), subsequent investigations of the AL model 
have demonstrated major theoretical and empirical limitations” (Geissler, 1983). This was 
presented in several studies by Parducci (1963, 1965), Sarris (1967, 1971), Johnson (1972), 
and Anderson (1974). Birnbaum (1974), among others, has shown that the mean ratings of 
two sets of numerals are inconsistent with Adaptation-Level Theory because they shift more 
rapidly where numerals are spaced more closely. “Helson did not recognize that a higher or-
der cognitive operation takes place in the construction of standards used in the evaluation 
process, that contextual information is actively – though not necessarily consciously – se-
lected. Today, the accepted theory of comparative judgment is the Range-Frequency Com-
promise theory put forward by Parducci (1961)” (Nussbaum, 2004). “Parducci and co-
workers sought to go beyond Helson’s simple idea that people respond to the mean or aver-
age of their sensory experiences in determining the frame of reference for judgment. Instead 
they asserted that the entire distribution of items in a psychophysical experiment would influ-
ence the judgments of a particular stimulus” (Lawless & Heymann, 1998).  
Parducci in his Range-Frequency Theory describes psychophysical judgment as a 
compromise between two principles: the range principle, and the frequency principle. “The 
range principle assumes that differences in response are directly proportional to differences 
in subjective value and inversely proportional to the range of subjective values. Subjects tend 
to locate each stimulus relative to the subjective end values” (Birnbaum, 1974). Parducci 
(1983) explains that: “The place of a stimulus in the range is reflected in the following defini-
tion: 
( ) ( )min max min/i iR s s s s= − −                           
where Ri is the range value, with smin and smax representing the lowest and highest of the 
stimulus values in the context of stimuli affecting the judgment of si. Ri is thus a proportion 
that can take any value between 0 and 1”.  
On the other hand “the frequency principle asserts that differences in response tend to 
                                                 
4It has to be added that there are some differences. First, Prospect Theory takes current wealth as its reference 
point whereas Adaptation-Level Theory takes the average value of all stimuli. For example, in the case of a 
prospect having two outcomes $0 and $100, the reference point assumed by Prospect Theory is $0, whereas AL 
Theory assumes a value of $50. Second, AL Theory assumes the perceptual value to be the difference between 
the logarithms of the stimulus and the AL, whereas Prospect Theory assumes it to be a power function of the 
difference between the stimulus and the reference level. It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze how these 
changes affect the perception value by making a comparison with Helson’s approach. The main thing to note is 
that Prospect Theory adopts the concept of a single level and this becomes the reference for further considera-
tions. 
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be proportional to differences in stimulus rank” (Birnbaum, 1974) and the final judgment 
function is a weighted sum of both principles. 
Most of the Parducci’s work, as well as that of other researchers, was devoted to ana-
lyzing the stimulus distribution and noting that its skewness impacts people’s judgments. 
“For example, Birnbaum (1992) demonstrated that the selection of certainty equivalent was 
influenced when skewing the distribution of options offered as certainty equivalents for simple 
prospects, while holding the maximum and minimum constant” (Vlaev, Chater, 2006). Par-
ducci himself considered this their major achievement. “Some of my early data were consis-
tent with adaptation-level theory: adaptation level tended to be close to the mean of the stim-
uli, just as the theory asserted. However, the ratings for skewed or asymmetrical sets of stim-
uli were not balanced at ‘neutral’ or ‘average’” (Parducci, 1995). 
4.3. From the viewpoint of the present review, there is, however, another result of 
much greater importance, viz. that Range-Frequency Theory considers ranges of stimuli and 
assumes relativity within these ranges. This differs from Helson’s approach, which considers 
stimuli relatively, but only to a certain level. To put it in another way: Helson’s theory as-
sumes one reference point (adaptation level), whereas Parducci’s theory assumes two refer-
ence points (minimum and maximum stimulus). As a result, Adaptation-Level Theory as-
sumes that all stimuli changes are expressed in absolute terms, whereas Range-Frequency 
Theory asserts that those changes are expressed in relation to the stimuli range. 
This difference between theories is rarely discussed in the literature as it does not in-
fluence category judgments. It does, however, have important consequences for determining 
perception levels. As the stimulus range can be, at least theoretically, unlimited, so can the 
perception range according to Helson’s theory. This is certainly not an intuitive assumption 
regarding the human perception system. Further, the perception of a given stimulus (say 101) 
in the context of a given adaptation level (say 100) is constant whatever the range of other 
stimuli. This would assume a constant sensitivity to a given stimulus change. However, the 
difference between 101 and 100 may be considered to be substantial in the stimuli range of 
95-105, but small in the stimuli range of 0-200. This observation is naturally embedded in 
Range-Frequency Theory, although apparently not overly emphasized, even by its author. 
The reasoning presented in this sub-point shows that Helson’s approach is incorrect 
from the perception viewpoint as the perception range is limited and sensitivity varies with 
stimulus range. This topic will be discussed in more detail in the next point.  
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5. Kinds of Adaptation 
5.1. Although Adaptation-Level and Range-Frequency are the underlying theories, 
more recent studies provide a deeper explanation of adaptation at the sensory level. Although 
there is a rich literature on this subject, we will confine ourselves here to the “Adaptation and 
the Phenomenology of Perception” review by Webster, Werner, and Field, which mostly cov-
ers visual cognition. The authors state: “The use of information theory has provided major 
insights into understanding of sensory coding. Neurons have a limited dynamic range, and 
because they are noisy can reliably signal only a relatively small number of response levels 
(Barlow and Levick, 1976). To maximize the information a neuron can carry, these levels 
should be matched to the distribution of levels in the stimulus. This principle closely predicts 
evolutionary adaptations such as the sigmoidal shape of a neuron's response function (Laugh-
lin, 1987)”.  
Figure 5.1. Distribution of the stimuli and the sigmoidal shape of a neuron’s response function for 
three different average stimulus values. The drawings are based on the paper by Webster et al. 
 
The authors explain this observation in more detail (see Figure 5.1): “Most points in a 
scene have a brightness and color that are close to the modal level, and thus the optimal re-
sponse function should be steep near the mode, to allow fine discrimination among frequently 
occurring stimulus values, while shallow at the tails, where signals are rare. This effectively 
expands the representation of data near the modal level and compresses those data near the 
outliers. By adjusting to the average stimulus the visual system could represent information 
by the deviations from the average. This gives special importance to the mean because it de-
fines the reference point to which other responses are now relative”.  
5.2. The process of shifting the reference point, which we call here level adaptation, 
should, however, be carefully separated from another effect, known as range adaptation5, 
which is associated with increasing or decreasing receptor sensitivity. As Webster continues: 
“In addition to the average stimulus, to realize its full capacity a neuron's operating curve 
should also be matched to the range of stimulus levels, or available contrasts. This form of 
                                                 
5The term “distribution adaptation” would even be better, but it would overcomplicate further considerations on 
the number of reference points and the notion of relativity. 
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adjustment, known as contrast adaptation, is also well established both in individual neurons 
and psychophysically” (Webster, 2003). Thus, for example, sensitivity to contrast is reduced 
in the presence of high contrast stimuli”. 
 
Figure 5.2. Distribution of the stimuli and the sigmoidal shape of a neuron’s response function for 
three different stimulus deviations. The drawings are based on the paper by Webster et al. 
The range effect can be described as succinctly as it was by Lawless and Heymann 
(1998): “Short ranges produce steep psychophysical functions, and wide ranges produce flat-
ter functions”. Very clearly, this varying sensitivity may be mathematically expressed as the 
derivative of the psychophysical function. The narrower the range, the greater the sensitivity; 
the wider the range, the lower the sensitivity. 
An interesting example of range adaptation is given by Parducci (1995): “On tropical 
islands where the temperature is almost always in the 80s, the natives are sensitive to differ-
ences that seem hardly noticeable to us; thus, they complain of the extremes, of the heat when 
the temperature is in the high 80s, of the cold when it is in the low 80s”. However, a varying 
sensitivity may affect not only the sensory, but also the mental system. For example, focusing 
attention on part of a problem increases sensitivity to its details. Focus broadening, by con-
trast, decreases this sensitivity. Changing sensitivity in response to changing stimulus values 
may also be observed with monetary outcomes. For instance, an absolute amount of money 
(say $10) may be relevant for a person shopping for goods worth $100 but completely irrele-
vant to the same person purchasing a house for $500,000. This means that sensitivity to finan-
cial stimuli is dependent on range as in the neuronal context. 
A nice range adaptation analogy is given by Robson in his deliberations on biology, 
evolution and human nature. Robson (2002) states: “Possessing utility that has a relative and 
local scale, rather than an absolute or global scale, may be biologically advantageous… This 
issue may be analogous to the use of a voltmeter. To obtain an accurate reading from this de-
vice, it is necessary to first estimate the range in which the unknown voltage fails. Only if the 
right range is selected on the device, such that the needle moves to the middle of the scale, is 
an accurate reading obtained”. In another paper, Robson (2001) analyzes an example of 
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choosing between two alternatives represented as numbers drawn from the same continuous 
cumulative distribution function. Robson concludes that “it is optimal for utility to adapt to 
the distribution F”. By this, he means adapting to the range and frequency of options as pro-
posed by Parducci.  
5.3. The evidence presented so far shows that two kinds of adaptation are present: 
level adaptation and range adaptation. In the visual system, different mechanisms are respon-
sible for brightness (level) and contrast (range) adaptation. There is an evidence that these two 
mechanisms work in tandem (Mante et. al, 2005, Wark et. al, 2007)6.  
The distinction between these two kinds of adaptation, however, is not so precisely 
noted in the psychology literature. For instance Frederick and Loewenstein state in their “He-
donic Adaptation” paper (1999): “Although we have used the term ‘adaptation’ broadly to 
denote anything that reduces the subjective intensity of a given stimulus, it is important to dis-
tinguish between adaptive processes that diminish subjective intensity by altering the stimulus 
level that is experienced as neutral (shifting adaptation levels) and adaptive processes that 
diminish the subjective intensity of the stimulus generally (desensitization)”. This sentence 
might suggest that they distinguish the same, two kinds of adaptation.  
 As it turns out, however, “desensitization” has little to do with range adaptation. It is 
understood as yet another process of decreasing stimuli amplification in the case of “hard-
ened”, “jaded”, or “jaundiced” people, who “are typically unmotivated to make any kind of 
change, whether local or global”. The opposite of “desensitization” is “sensitization”, which 
means that “hedonic intensity of a constant stimulus increases over time”. An example of this 
is “the increasing irritation produced by exposure to a disliked roommate” (Frederick, 
Lowenstein, 1999). 
Hedonic adaptation is therefore mainly understood as “shifting adaptation levels”. On 
the other hand, the authors state that “shifting adaptation levels preserve or enhance sensitiv-
ity to stimulus differences”, and that “hedonic adaptation may also increase our sensitivity to, 
and motivation to make, local changes in our objective circumstances”. Obviously, “increas-
ing sensitivity” here means something other than “sensitization”. To illustrate this effect, the 
authors consider a man who has been incarcerated. The authors do not recognize his increas-
                                                 
6It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the details of this topic. Once it is known, however, how adaptation 
systems work, their dynamic behavior can be easily predicted. In a steady situation, stimuli (like temperature or 
odors) are not perceived (thanks to level adaptation), and the perception system is tuned to be highly sensitive to 
stimuli changes (thanks to the adaptation to their narrow range). In the case of a sudden stimuli change, sensitiv-
ity decreases (as the stimulus range widens), and the perception system starts to adapt to the new stimulus level 
and sensitivity increases once more. Evolution has done a perfect job: this is how some modern automatic gain 
control amplifiers work. 
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ing sensitivity to the jail size as the result of a separate adaptation process. They try to explain 
both his shifting to a new adaptation level (being incarcerated) and his increasing sensitivity 
(to the jail size) by using the value function of Prospect Theory. The presented explanation, 
however, is only seemingly correct7. 
5.4. Admittedly, Frederick and Loewenstein also consider the subject of multiple ref-
erence points and come to conclusions which are very similar to those presented in this paper: 
“The literature on sensory and perceptual adaptation has commonly assumed that the adap-
tation level in a particular domain can be characterized by a single summary number.... 
However, the effect of past stimuli cannot be summarized so simply” (as a single adaptation 
level). They consider “an individual who earned $20,000 annually for her first six years on 
the job, got a promotion that raised her salary to $50,000, then was transferred two years 
later to a different department where she earned $40,000”. The authors pose the question: 
“What is her adaptation level income?” and answer that: “It is possible that she compares her 
current salary to a single adaptation level lying somewhere between $20,000 and $50,000. It 
seems more likely, however, that she has two different adaptation levels – one at $20,000 and 
the other at $50,000 - that are invoked in different situations and both of which contribute to 
her satisfaction or dissatisfaction with her current salary”. They conclude by stating that “al-
though the issue of multiple reference points has been raised, their formation and relative 
weighting has not been investigated empirically”.  
It seems that the alternative presented by Frederick and Loewenstein has still not been 
tested – even in more recent studies. Most of the papers that deal with multiple reference 
points are concerned with the effect of shifting a single adaptation level (see for instance 
Schwartz et al., 2008). The Prospect Theory paradigm is so strong that it is nigh impossible to 
find any attempt to analyze the concept of two reference points defining the range of consid-
ered values. 
5.5. It has to be added that choosing the range with the minimum and maximum values 
of the options under consideration may only be a simplified model of the cognition process. 
This is due to the state of attention. According to a classical definition: “Attention is the tak-
                                                 
7The explanation is made graphically using a very curved value function an a low loss aversion factor. Although 
most probably intended as an illustration only, the solution should also be mathematically correct. The inequality 
on page 304 can be presented more generally as ( )1r r
α α
λ λ− > − , where r is the ratio of two options (r>1). It 
is easy to check that, using the Prospect Theory parameterization, this inequality only holds for r in the range 
[1.0, 1.003], which is clearly too narrow to claim that the phenomenon of increasing sensitivity has been ex-
plained using the value function. This merely shows that it is extremely difficult to explain a given phenomenon 
using a theory which is not aware of it.  
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ing possession by the mind of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought” (James, 1890).  Keegan (2010) differentiates Focused and Divided atten-
tion: “Focused attention is the kind of attention we use when we are actively attending to 
something. It is our ability to attend to one thing to the exclusion of everything else”. Robbins 
(2000) differentiates Sustained, Divided and Selective (Focused) attention and claims that the 
last is deployed “where an animal has to focus resources on a restricted number of sensory 
channels while ignoring the rest”. From the above definitions, it follows that focused atten-
tion is the state of highest concentration of attention which (according to James’ classical 
definition), “implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others”. 
  These definitions indicate that people concentrate on the range of options considered 
in the state of focused attention. This is especially the case under experimental conditions as 
those surveyed are remunerated for their participation and are paid to focus their whole atten-
tion on the problems being analyzed. However, since attention and its degree of concentration 
decide the choice of reference values and, since there are other signals and issues vying for 
attention, it may be assumed that other quantities are potential reference values. This may ex-
plain why the decision or judgment process is often influenced by random events (anchoring).  
A more detailed discussion of this topic, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
6. Kinds of Relativity  
6.1. It should be clear from the considerations presented so far, that both kinds of ad-
aptation lead to different notions of relativity. Level relativity means that stimulus changes are 
represented in absolute terms. This concept is employed by Prospect Theory, which assumes 
that gains and losses are perceived in terms of monetary amounts. This is best exemplified by 
the form of the value function:  
( )v x x
α
λ=  
 
where x (a gain or a loss) is expressed in absolute terms.  
 Range relativity assumes that stimulus changes are perceived in relative terms as a 
proportion of the stimulus range (see point 4.2). This approach is not implemented by Pros-
pect Theory, as it would require that the value function be defined as a function of relatively 
expressed outcomes.  
 The lack of a clear distinction between the two kinds of relativity leads to the gener-
ally held view that Prospect Theory adopts a relative approach to decision making. This, how-
ever, is only half true.  
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6.2. Citations concerning (level) relativity need not be presented here as they are en-
countered in almost every text on the subject. However, the question as to whether range rela-
tivity is admitted by modern behavioral economics is a legitimate one and, in contrast to range 
adaptation, is answered with an unqualified “yes”.  
First, Mental Accounting as proposed by Thaler (1980, 1999) is “the set of cognitive 
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of finan-
cial activities”. As Thaler explains: “Expenditures are grouped into categories (housing, 
food, etc.) and spending is sometimes constrained by implicit or explicit budget…Money in 
one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in another account”. As each ac-
count differs in size, the effect described may be attributed to range relativity. 
Thaler (1999) also reconsiders the well known example, first discussed by Savage 
(1954), that “most people say that they will travel to save the $5 when the item costs $15 but 
not when it costs $125”. Thaler explains that: “five dollars seems like a significant saving on 
a $15 purchase, but not on a $125 purchase”. Thaler (1980) proposes that “search for any 
purchase will continue until the expected amount saved as a proportion of the total price 
equals some critical value. This hypothesis is a simple application of the Weber-Fechner law 
of psychophysics. The law states that the just noticeable difference in any stimulus is propor-
tional to the stimulus” (emphasis added). Thaler obviously talks about the range relativity ef-
fect, however he then engages Prospect Theory to explain this phenomena.  
The concept of mental accounts is also considered by Kahneman and Tversky (1985), 
who define minimal, topical, and comprehensive accounts. “The minimal account includes 
only the difference between the two options. A topical account relates the consequences of 
possible choices to a reference level that is determined by the context within which the deci-
sion arises. A comprehensive account incorporates all other factors including current wealth, 
future earnings, possible outcomes of other probabilistic holdings” (Kahneman, Tversky 
1984, Thaler, 1999). Kahneman and Tversky conclude: “We suggest, however, that people 
spontaneously frame decisions in terms of topical account” and that “The topical organiza-
tion of mental accounts leads people to evaluate gains and losses in relative rather than in 
absolute terms” (emphasis added). This conclusion is obviously in full accordance with the 
concept of range relativity. 
Interestingly, the concept of range relativity has reappeared in more recent papers. For 
instance: “Stewart et al. (2003) argued for the existence of what they called prospect relativ-
ity: that the perceived value of a risky prospect is relative to other prospects with which it is 
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presented. The prediction is that the option set will affect people’s choices because there is no 
fixed internal scale according to which people make their judgments of the values of certain 
options. People’s expressed (or revealed) risk preferences are not absolute, but are, to some 
degree at least, relative to the range of available options” (Vlaev and Chater, 2007).  
An interesting confirmation of range relativity was recently reported by Baltussen, 
Post and Van den Assem (2007). The authors used an extensive sample of choices from ten 
different editions of the high stakes TV game show “Deal or No Deal”. “In each sample, con-
testants respond in a similar way to the stakes relative to their initial level, even though the 
initial level differs widely across the various editions. Amounts therefore appear to be primar-
ily evaluated relative to a subjective frame of reference rather than in terms of their absolute 
monetary value” (Baltussen, Post, Van den Assem, 2008). To summarize, the absolute 
amount of a given deal is not crucial; what matters most is its ratio to the initial stake.    
As presented, range relativity is an effect well known to Kahneman and Tversky, and 
other researchers. It is, however, important to note that Kahneman and Tversky published on 
this subject in the 1980s, whereas Prospect Theory was introduced in 1979 and its underlying 
assumption is level relativity, i.e. that gains and losses are perceived as monetary amounts. 
This assumption remained unchanged in the cumulative  version of this theory introduced in 
1992.  
7. Discussion 
It may be argued that the way in which gains and losses are represented (i.e. in abso-
lute or relative terms) does not matter as Prospect Theory can explain the range effects by 
comparing the prospect values of two options. It may be also argued that this kind of repre-
sentation does not influence choices between the two options for the same reason. This is true 
but this line of reasoning is only partially satisfactory.  
This is because the assumption of one reference (adaptation) level, together with the 
assumption that gains and losses are perceived in absolute terms, does not reflect the human 
perceptual system. This may be summarized as follows: according to Prospect Theory, a 
prospect value may even assume an infinite value; a given monetary amount (like $10) has a 
constant psychological value; and the sensitivity to a given amount is constant whatever other 
amounts under consideration. This means that the underlying principle of Prospect Theory is 
psychophysically incorrect.  
Another argument against the Prospect Theory approach is that level adaptation and 
the resulting single reference point is too simplified a model to describe the complexity of 
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human behavior. This has been shown by Parducci in his Range-Frequency Theory, and 
stated by many other researchers since then (including Frederick and Loewenstein). This as-
sumption therefore prevents the theory from being able to describe and explain more complex 
behavioral patterns.  
Finally, the kind of adaptation adopted as the basic principle has a surprising impact 
on the shape of the decision making model. Kontek (2009) has shown that the assumption of 
absolute notion of gains and losses, inevitably leads to the design of a theory that incorporates 
the concept of probability weighting. On the other hand gains and losses expressed in relative 
terms, lead to a model that does not require probability weighting in order to describe lottery 
experiments. This means that level adaptation leads to a more complex decision making 
model.  
The review and considerations presented in this paper may, therefore, be of signifi-
cance to future decision-making theories. 
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